Abstract. Ordinal analysis of theories is a core area of proof theory whose origins can be traced back to Hilbert's programme -the aim of which was to lay to rest all worries about the foundations of mathematics once and for all by securing mathematics via an absolute proof of consistency. Ordinal-theoretic proof theory came into existence in 1936, springing forth from Gentzen's head in the course of his consistency proof of arithmetic. The central theme of ordinal analysis is the classification of theories by means of transfinite ordinals that measure their 'consistency strength' and 'computational power'. The so-called proof-theoretic ordinal of a theory also serves to characterize its provably recursive functions and can yield both conservation and combinatorial independence results.
Introduction
Ordinal analysis of theories is a core area of proof theory. The origins of proof theory can be traced back to the second problem on Hilbert's famous list of problems (presented at the Second International Congress in Paris on August 8, 1900) , which called for a proof of consistency of the arithmetical axioms of the reals. Hilbert's work on axiomatic geometry marked the beginning of his live-long interest in the axiomatic method. For geometry, he solved the problem of consistency by furnishing arithmetical-analytical interpretations of the axioms, thereby reducing the question of consistency to the consistency of the axioms for real numbers. The consistency of the latter system of axioms is therefore the ultimate problem for the foundations of mathematics.
Which axioms for real numbers Hilbert had in mind in his problem was made precise only when he took up logic full scale in the 1920s and proposed a research programme with the aim of providing mathematics with a secure foundation. This was to be accomplished by first formalizing logic and mathematics in their entirety, and then showing that these formalizations are consistent, that is to say free of contra-dictions. Strong restrictions were placed on the methods to be applied in consistency proofs of axiom systems for mathematics: namely, these methods were to be completely finitistic in character. The proposal to obtain finitistic consistency proofs of axiom systems for mathematics came to be called Hilbert's Programme.
Hilbert's Programme is a reductive enterprise with the aim of showing that whenever a 'real' proposition can be proved by 'ideal' means, it can also be proved by 'real', finitistic means. However, Hilbert's so-called formalism was not intended to eliminate nonconstructive existence proofs in the practice of mathematics, but to vindicate them.
In the 1920s, Ackermann and von Neumann, in pursuit of Hilbert's Programme, were working on consistency proofs for arithmetical systems. Ackermann's 1924 dissertation gives a consistency proof for a second-order version of primitive recursive arithmetic which explicitly uses a finitistic version of transfinite induction up to the ordinal ω ω ω . The employment of transfinite induction on ordinals in consistency proofs came explicitly to the fore in Gentzen's 1936 consistency proof for Peano arithmetic, PA. This proof led to the assignment of a proof-theoretic ordinal to a theory. This so-called ordinal analysis of theories allows one to classify theories by means of transfinite ordinals that measure their 'consistency strength' and 'computational power'.
The subject of this paper is the development of ordinal analysis from the work of Gentzen up to very recent advances in determining the proof-theoretic ordinals of strong subsystems of second order arithmetic. To appreciate Gentzen's result it is pivotal to note that he applied transfinite induction up to ε 0 solely to elementary computable predicates and besides that his proof used only finitistically justified means. Hence, a more precise rendering of Gentzen's result is F + EC-TI(ε 0 ) Con(PA);
here F signifies a theory that embodies only finitistically acceptable means, EC-TI(ε 0 ) stands for transfinite induction up to ε 0 for elementary computable predicates, and Con(PA) expresses the consistency of PA. Gentzen also showed that his result was the best possible in that PA proves transfinite induction up to α for arithmetic predicates for any α < ε 0 . The compelling picture conjured up by the above is that the nonfinitist part of PA is encapsulated in EC-TI(ε 0 ) and therefore "measured" by ε 0 , thereby tempting one to adopt the following definition of proof-theoretic ordinal of a theory T :
In the above, many notions were left unexplained. We will now consider them one by one. The elementary computable functions are exactly the Kalmar elementary functions, i.e. the class of functions which contains the successor, projection, zero, addition, multiplication, and modified subtraction functions and is closed under composition and bounded sums and products. A predicate is elementary computable if its characteristic function is elementary computable.
According to an influential analysis of finitism due to W.W. Tait, finististic reasoning coincides with a system known as primitive recursive arithmetic. For the purposes of ordinal analysis, however, it suffices to identify F with an even more restricted theory known as Elementary Recursive Arithmetic, ERA. ERA is a weak subsystem of PA having the same defining axioms for +, ×, E, < but with induction restricted to elementary computable predicates.
In order to formalize EC-TI(α) in the language of arithmetic we should first discuss ordinals and the representation of particular ordinals α as relations on N.
We are interested in representing specific ordinals α as relations on N. In essence Cantor [10] defined the first ordinal representation system in 1897. Natural ordinal representation systems are frequently derived from structures of the form
where α is an ordinal, < α is the ordering of ordinals restricted to elements of α and the f i are functions
is a computable (or recursive) representation of A if the following conditions hold:
1. A ⊆ N and A is a computable set.
2. ≺ is a computable total ordering on A and the functions g i are computable.
3.
A ∼ = A, i.e. the two structures are isomorphic.
Theorem 1.4 (Cantor, 1897). For every ordinal β > 0 there exist unique ordinals
The representation of β in (5) is called the Cantor normal form. We shall write β = CNF ω β 1 + · · · + ω β n to convey that β 0 ≥ β 1 ≥ · · · ≥ β k . ε 0 denotes the least ordinal α > 0 such that (∀β < α) ω β < α. ε 0 can also be described as the least ordinal α such that ω α = α.
Ordinals β < ε 0 have a Cantor normal form with exponents β i < β and these exponents have Cantor normal forms with yet again smaller exponents. As this process must terminate, ordinals < ε 0 can be coded by natural numbers. For instance a coding function . : ε 0 −→ N could be defined as follows:
with p i being the ith prime number (or any other coding of tuples). Further define:
A 0 ,+,·, x →ω x , ≺ are computable (recursive), in point of fact, they are all elementary computable. Finally, we can spell out the scheme EC-TI(ε 0 ) in the language of PA:
for all elementary computable predicates P .
Cut Elimination:
Gentzen's Hauptsatz. In the consistency proof, Gentzen used his sequent calculus and employed the technique of cut elimination. As this is a tool of utmost importance in proof theory and ordinal analysis, a rough outline of the underlying ideas will be discussed next.
The most common logical calculi are Hilbert-style systems. They are specified by delineating a collection of schematic logical axioms and some inference rules. The choice of axioms and rules is more or less arbitrary, only subject to the desire to obtain a complete system (in the sense of Gödel's completeness theorem). In model theory it is usually enough to know that there is a complete calculus for first order logic as this already entails the compactness theorem.
There are, however, proof calculi without this arbitrariness of axioms and rules. The natural deduction calculus and the sequent calculus were both invented by Gentzen. Both calculi are pretty illustrations of the symmetries of logic. The sequent calculus since is a central tool in ordinal analysis and allows for generalizations to so-called infinitary logics. Gentzen's main theorem about the sequent calculus is the Hauptsatz, i.e. the cut elimination theorem.
A sequent is an expression ⇒ where and are finite sequences of formulae A 1 , . . . , A n and B 1 , . . . , B m , respectively. We also allow for the possibility that or (or both) are empty. The empty sequence will be denoted by ∅. ⇒ is read, informally, as yields or, rather, the conjunction of the A i yields the disjunction of the B j . In particular, we have:
• If is empty, the sequent asserts the disjunction of the B j .
• If is empty, it asserts the negation of the conjunction of the A i .
• if and are both empty, it asserts the impossible, i.e. a contradiction.
We use upper case Greek letters , , , , . . . to range over finite sequences of formulae. ⊆ means that every formula of is also a formula of .
Next we list the axioms and rules of the sequent calculus.
• Identity Axiom:
where A is any formula. In point of fact, one could limit this axiom to the case of atomic formulae A.
• Cut Rule:
The formula A is called the cut formula of the inference.
• Structural Rules:
A special case of the structural rule, known as contraction, occurs when the lower sequent has fewer occurrences of a formula than the upper sequent. For instance, A, ⇒ , B follows structurally from A, A, ⇒ , B, B.
• Rules for Logical Operations:
In ∀L and ∃R, t is an arbitrary term. The variable a in ∀R and ∃L is an eigenvariable of the respective inference, i.e. a is not to occur in the lower sequent.
In the rules for logical operations, the formulae highlighted in the premisses are called the minor formulae of that inference, while the formula highlighted in the conclusion is the principal formula of that inference. The other formulae of an inference are called side formulae.
A proof (also known as deduction or derivation) D is a tree of sequents satisfying the following conditions:
• The topmost sequents of D are identity axioms.
• Every sequent in D except the lowest one is an upper sequent of an inference whose lower sequent is also in D.
A sequent ⇒ is deducible if there is a proof having ⇒ as its the bottom sequent.
The Cut rule differs from the other rules in an important respect. With the rules for introduction of a connective on the left or the right, one sees that every formula that occurs above the line occurs below the line either directly, or as a subformula of a formula below the line, and that is also true for the structural rules. (Here A(t) is counted as a subformula, in a slightly extended sense, of both ∃xA(x) and ∀xA(x).) But in the case of the Cut rule, the cut formula A vanishes. Gentzen showed that such "vanishing rules" can be eliminated. The secret to Gentzen's Hauptsatz is the symmetry of left and right rules for the logical connectives. The proof of the cut elimination theorem is rather intricate as the process of removing cuts interferes with the structural rules. The possibility of contraction accounts for the high cost of eliminating cuts. Let |D| be the height of the deduction D. Also, let rank(D) be supremum of the lengths of cut formulae occurring in D. Turning D into a cut-free deduction of the same end sequent results, in the worst case, in a deduction of height H(rank(D), |D|) where H(0, n) = n and
The Hauptsatz has an important corollary which explains its crucial role in obtaining consistency proofs. Proof. According to the Hauptsatz, if the empty sequent were deducible it would have a deduction without cuts. In a cut-free deduction of the empty sequent only empty sequents can occur. But such a deduction does not exist.
While mathematics is based on logic, it cannot be developed solely on the basis of pure logic. What is needed in addition are axioms that assert the existence of mathematical objects and their properties. Logic plus axioms gives rise to (formal) theories such as Peano arithmetic or the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. What happens when we try to apply the procedure of cut elimination to theories? Well, axioms are poisonous to this procedure. It breaks down because the symmetry of the sequent calculus is lost. In general, we cannot remove cuts from deductions in a theory T when the cut formula is an axiom of T . However, sometimes the axioms of a theory are of bounded syntactic complexity. Then the procedure applies partially in that one can remove all cuts that exceed the complexity of the axioms of T . This gives rise to partial cut elimination. It is a very important tool in proof theory. For example, it works very well if the axioms of a theory can be presented as atomic intuitionistic sequents (also called Horn clauses), yielding the completeness of Robinsons resolution method. Partial cut elimination also pays off in the case of fragments of PA and set theory with restricted induction schemes, be it induction on natural numbers or sets. This method can be used to extract bounds from proofs of 0 2 statements in such fragments.
Full arithmetic (i.e. PA), though, does not even allow for partial cut elimination since the induction axioms have unbounded complexity. However, one can remove the obstacle to cut elimination in a drastic way by going infinite. The so-called ω-rule consists of the two types of infinitary inferences:
The price to pay will be that deductions become infinite objects, i.e. infinite wellfounded trees.
The sequent-style version of Peano arithmetic with the ω-rule will be termed PA ω . PA ω has no use for free variables. Thus free variables are discarded and all terms will be closed. All formulae of this system are therefore closed, too. The numerals are the terms n, where0 = 0 and n + 1 = Sn. We shall identify n with the natural number n. All terms t of PA ω evaluate to a numeral n.
PA ω has all the inference rules of the sequent calculus except for ∀R and ∃L. In their stead, PA ω has the ωR and ωL inferences. The Axioms of PA ω are the following:
is an atomic sentence and s i and t i evaluate to the same numeral.
With the aid of the ω-rule, each instance of the induction scheme becomes logically deducible, albeit the price to pay will be that the proof tree becomes infinite. To describe the cost of cut elimination for PA ω , we introduce the measures of height and cut rank of a PA ω deduction D. We will notate this by
The above relation is defined inductively following the buildup of the deduction D. For the cut rank we need the definition of the length, |A| of a formula:
Now suppose the last inference of D is of the form ⇒ . The ordinal analysis of PA proceeds by first unfolding any PA-deduction into a PA ω -deduction:
for some m, k < ω. The next step is to get rid of the cuts. It turns out that the cost of lowering the cut rank from k + 1 to k is an exponential with base ω.
As a result, if PA ω α n ⇒ , we may apply the previous theorem n times to
, where the stack has height n. Combining this with the result from (6), it follows that every sequent ⇒ deducible in PA has a cut-free deduction in PA ω of length < ε 0 . Ruminating on the details of how this result was achieved yields a consistency proof for PA from transfinite induction up to ε 0 for elementary decidable predicates on the basis of finitistic reasoning (as described in (1)).
Deductions in PA ω being well-founded infinite trees, they have a natural associated ordinal length, namely: the height of the tree as an ordinal. Thus the passage from finite deductions in PA to infinite cut-free deductions in PA ω provides an explanation of how the ordinal ε 0 is connected with PA.
Gentzen, however, did not consider infinite proof trees. The infinitary version of PA with the ω-rule was introduced by Schütte in [35] . Incidentally, the ω-rule had already been proposed by Hilbert [18] . Gentzen worked with finite deductions in the sequent calculus version of PA, devising an ingenious method of assigning ordinals to purported derivations of the empty sequent (inconsistency). It turns out in recent work by Buchholz [9] that in fact there is a much closer intrinsic connection between the way Gentzen assigned ordinals to deductions in PA and the way that ordinals are assigned to infinite deductions in PA ω .
In the 1950s infinitary proof theory flourished in the hands of Schütte. He extended his approach to PA to systems of ramified analysis and brought this technique to perfection in his monograph "Beweistheorie" [36] . The ordinal representation systems necessary for Schütte's work will be reviewed in the next subsection.
A brief history of ordinal representation systems: 1904-1950.
Ordinals assigned as lengths to deductions to keep track of the cost of operations such as cut elimination render ordinal analyses of theories particularly transparent. In the case of PA, Gentzen could rely on Cantor's normal form for a supply of ordinal representations. For stronger theories, though, segments larger than ε 0 have to be employed. Ordinal representation systems utilized by proof theorists in the 1960s arose in a purely set-theoretic context. This subsection will present some of the underlying ideas as progress in ordinal-theoretic proof theory also hinges on the development of sufficiently strong and transparent ordinal representation systems.
In 1904, Hardy [17] wanted to "construct" a subset of R of size ℵ 1 . His method was to represent countable ordinals via increasing sequence of natural numbers and then to correlate a decimal expansion with each such sequence. Hardy used two processes on sequences: (i) Removing the first element to represent the successor; (ii) Diagonalizing at limits. E. Veblen [44] extended the initial segment of the countable for which fundamental sequences can be given effectively. The new tools he devised were the operations of derivation and transfinite iteration applied to continuous increasing functions on ordinals. If f is a normal function, {α : f (α) = α} is a proper class and f will be a normal function, too. Definition 1.11. Now, given a normal function f : ON → ON, define a hierarchy of normal functions as follows:
In this way, from the normal function f we get a two-place function, ϕ f (α, β) := f α (β). Veblen then discusses the hierarchy when f = , where (α) = 1 + α.
The least ordinal γ > 0 closed under ϕ , i.e. the least ordinal > 0 satisfying (∀α, β < γ ) ϕ (α, β) < γ is the famous ordinal 0 which Feferman [13] and Schütte [37] , [38] determined to be the least ordinal 'unreachable' by predicative means.
Veblen extended this idea first to arbitrary finite numbers of arguments, but then also to transfinite numbers of arguments, with the proviso that in, for example 
if λ is a limit with τ λ < ,
After the work of Bachmann, the story of ordinal representations becomes very complicated. Significant papers (by Isles, Bridge, Pfeiffer, Schütte, Gerber to mention a few) involve quite horrendous computations to keep track of the fundamental sequences. Also Bachmann's approach was combined with uses of higher type functionals by Aczel and Weyhrauch. Feferman proposed an entirely different method for generating a Bachmann-type hierarchy of normal functions which does not involve fundamental sequences. Buchholz further simplified the systems and proved their recursivity. For details we recommend the preface to [7] .
Ordinal analyses of systems of second order arithmetic and set theory
Ordinal analysis is concerned with theories serving as frameworks for formalising significant parts of mathematics. It is known that virtually all of ordinary mathematics can be formalized in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice, ZFC. Hilbert and Bernays [19] showed that large chunks of mathematics can already be formalized in second order arithmetic. Owing to these observations, proof theory has been focusing on set theories and subsystems of second order arithmetic. Further scrutiny revealed that a small fragment is sufficient. Under the rubric of Reverse Mathematics a research programme has been initiated by Harvey Friedman some thirty years ago. The idea is to ask whether, given a theorem, one can prove its equivalence to some axiomatic system, with the aim of determining what prooftheoretical resources are necessary for the theorems of mathematics. More precisely, the objective of reverse mathematics is to investigate the role of set existence axioms in ordinary mathematics. The main question can be stated as follows:
Given a specific theorem τ of ordinary mathematics, which set existence axioms are needed in order to prove τ ?
Central to the above is the reference to what is called 'ordinary mathematics'. This concept, of course, doesn't have a precise definition. Roughly speaking, by ordinary mathematics we mean main-stream, non-set-theoretic mathematics, i.e. the core areas of mathematics which make no essential use of the concepts and methods of set theory and do not essentially depend on the theory of uncountable cardinal numbers.
Subsystems of second order arithmetic.
The framework chosen for studying set existence in reverse mathematics, though, is second order arithmetic rather than set theory. Second order arithmetic, Z 2 , is a two-sorted formal system with one sort of variables x, y, z, . . . ranging over natural numbers and the other sort X, Y, Z, . . . ranging over sets of natural numbers. The language L 2 of second-order arithmetic also contains the symbols of PA, and in addition has a binary relation symbol ∈ for elementhood. Formulae are built from the prime formulae s = t, s < t, and s ∈ X (where s, t are numerical terms, i.e. terms of PA) by closing off under the connectives ∧, ∨, →, ¬, numerical quantifiers ∀x, ∃x, and set quantifiers ∀X, ∃X. The basic arithmetical axioms in all theories of second-order arithmetic are the defining axioms for 0, 1, +, ×, E, < (as for PA) and the induction axiom
We consider the axiom schema of C-comprehension for formula classes C which is given by C-CA ∃X∀u(u ∈ X ↔ F (u)) for all formulae F ∈ C in which X does not occur. Natural formula classes are the arithmetical formulae, consisting of all formulae without second order quantifiers ∀X and ∃X, and the 1 n -formulae, where a 1 n -formula is a formula of the form ∀X 1 . . . QX n A(X 1 , . . . , X n ) with ∀X 1 . . . QX n being a string of n alternating set quantifiers, commencing with a universal one, followed by an arithmetical formula A(X 1 , . . . , X n ).
For each axiom scheme Ax we denote by (Ax) 0 the theory consisting of the basic arithmetical axioms plus the scheme Ax. By contrast, (Ax) stands for the theory (Ax) 0 augmented by the scheme of induction for all L 2 -formulae.
An example for these notations is the theory ( 1 1 -CA) 0 which has the comprehension schema for 1 1 -formulae. In PA one can define an elementary injective pairing function on numbers, e.g (n, m) := 2 n × 3 m . With the help of this function an infinite sequence of sets of natural numbers can be coded as a single set of natural numbers. The n th section of set of natural numbers U is defined by U n := {m : (n, m) ∈ U }. Using this coding, we can formulate the axiom of choice for formulae F in C by
C-AC ∀x∃Y F (x, Y ) → ∃Y ∀xF (x, Y x ).
For many mathematical theorems τ , there is a weakest natural subsystem S(τ ) of Z 2 such that S(τ ) proves τ . Very often, if a theorem of ordinary mathematics is proved from the weakest possible set existence axioms, the statement of that theorem will turn out to be provably equivalent to those axioms over a still weaker base theory. This theme is referred to as Reverse Mathematics. Moreover, it has turned out that S(τ ) often belongs to a small list of specific subsystems of Z 2 dubbed RCA 0 , WKL 0 , ACA 0 , ATR 0 and ( 1 1 -CA) 0 , respectively. The systems are enumerated in increasing strength. The main set existence axioms of RCA 0 , WKL 0 , ACA 0 , ATR 0 , and ( 1 1 -CA) 0 are recursive comprehension, weak König's lemma, arithmetical comprehension, arithmetical transfinite recursion, and 1 1 -comprehension, respectively. For exact definitions of all these systems and their role in reverse mathematics see [40] . The proof-theoretic strength of RCA 0 is weaker than that of PA while ACA 0 has the same strength as PA. Let |T | = |T | Con . To get a sense of scale, the strengths of the first four theories are best expressed via their proof-theoretic ordinals: 0 |, however, eludes expression in the ordinal representations introduced so far. 1 1 -CA involves a so-called impredicative definition. An impredicative definition of an object refers to a presumed totality of which the object being defined is itself to be a member. For example, to define a set of natural numbers X as X = {n∈N : ∀Y ⊆ N F (n, Y )} is impredicative since it involves the quantified variable 'Y ' ranging over arbitrary subsets of the natural numbers N, of which the set X being defined is one member.
Determining whether ∀Y ⊆ N F (n, Y ) holds involves an apparent circle since we shall have to know in particular whether F (n, X) holds -but that cannot be settled until X itself is determined. Impredicative set definitions permeate the fabric of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory in the guise of the separation and replacement axioms as well as the powerset axiom.
A major breakthrough was made by Takeuti in 1967, who for the first time obtained an ordinal analysis of an impredicative theory. In [41] he gave an ordinal analysis of ( 1 1 -CA), extended in 1973 to ( 1 1 -AC) in [43] jointly with Yasugi. For this Takeuti returned to Gentzen's method of assigning ordinals (ordinal diagrams, to be precise) to purported derivations of the empty sequent (inconsistency).
The next wave of results, which concerned theories of iterated inductive definitions, were obtained by Buchholz, Pohlers, and Sieg in the late 1970s (see [7] ). Takeuti's methods of reducing derivations of the empty sequent ("the inconsistency") were extremely difficult to follow, and therefore a more perspicuous treatment was to be hoped for. Since the use of the infinitary ω-rule had greatly facilitated the ordinal analysis of number theory, new infinitary rules were sought. In 1977 (see [5] ) Buchholz introduced such rules, dubbed -rules to stress the analogy. They led to a proof-theoretic treatment of a wide variety of systems, as exemplified in the monograph [8] by Buchholz and Schütte. Yet simpler infinitary rules were put forward a few years later by Pohlers, leading to the method of local predicativity, which proved to be a very versatile tool (see [23] ).
Set theories.
With the work of Jäger and Pohlers (see [20] , [21] ) the forum of ordinal analysis then switched from the realm of second-order arithmetic to set theory, shaping what is now called admissible proof theory, after the models of Kripke-Platek set theory, KP. Their work culminated in the analysis of the system 1 1 -AC plus an induction principle called Bar Induction BI which is a scheme asserting that transfinite induction along well-founded relations holds for arbitrary formulae (see [21] ).
By and large, ordinal analyses for set theories are more uniform and transparent than for subsystems of Z 2 . The axiom systems for set theories considered in this paper are formulated in the usual language of set theory (called L ∈ hereafter) containing ∈ as the only non-logical symbol besides =. Formulae are built from prime formulae a ∈ b and a = b by use of propositional connectives and quantifiers ∀x, ∃x. Quantifiers of the forms ∀x ∈ a, ∃x ∈ a are called bounded. Bounded or 0 -formulae are the formulae wherein all quantifiers are bounded; 1 -formulae are those of the form ∃xϕ(x) where ϕ(a) is a 0 -formula. For n > 0, n -formulae ( n -formulae) are the formulae with a prefix of n alternating unbounded quantifiers starting with a universal (existential) one followed by a 0 -formula. The class of -formulae is the smallest class of formulae containing the 0 -formulae which is closed under ∧, ∨, bounded quantification and unbounded existential quantification.
One of the set theories which is amenable to ordinal analysis is Kripke-Platek set theory, KP. Its standard models are called admissible sets. One of the reasons that this is an important theory is that a great deal of set theory requires only the axioms of KP. An even more important reason is that admissible sets have been a major source of interaction between model theory, recursion theory and set theory (cf. [4] ). KP arises from ZF by completely omitting the power set axiom and restricting separation and collection to bounded formulae. These alterations are suggested by the informal notion of 'predicative'. To be more precise, the axioms of KP consist of Extensionality, Pair, Union, Infinity, Bounded Separation
for all bounded formulae F (u), Bounded Collection ∀x ∈ a ∃y G(x, y) → ∃z ∀x ∈ a ∃y ∈ z G (x, y) for all bounded formulae G(x, y), and Set Induction
for all formulae H (x).
A transitive set A such that (A, ∈) is a model of KP is called an admissible set. Of particular interest are the models of KP formed by segments of Gödel's constructible hierarchy L. The constructible hierarchy is obtained by iterating the definable powerset operation through the ordinals
So any element of L of level α is definable from elements of L with levels < α and the parameter L α . An ordinal α is admissible if the structure (L α , ∈) is a model of KP. Formulae of L 2 can be easily translated into the language of set theory. Some of the subtheories of Z 2 considered above have set-theoretic counterparts, characterized by extensions of KP. KPi is an extension of KP via the axiom
(Lim) ∀x∃y[x∈y ∧ y is an admissible set].
KPl denotes the system KPi without Bounded Collection. It turns out that ( 1 1 -AC)+ BI proves the same L 2 -formulae as KPi, while ( 1 1 -CA) proves the same L 2 -formulae as KPl.
Sketches of an ordinal analysis of KP.
Serving as a miniature example of an ordinal analysis of an impredicative system, the ordinal analysis of KP (see [20] , [6] ) we will sketched in broad strokes. Bachmann's system can be recast without fundamental sequences as follows: Let be a "big" ordinal, e.g. = ℵ 1 . By recursion on α we define sets C (α, β) and the ordinal ψ (α) as follows:
It can be shown that ψ (α) is always defined and that ψ (α) < . Moreover,
thus the order-type of the ordinals below which belong to the set C (α, ψ (α)) is ψ (α). ψ (α) is also a countable ordinal. In more pictorial terms, ψ (α) is the α th collapse of . Let ε +1 be the least ordinal α > such that ω α = α. The set of ordinals C (ε +1 , 0) gives rise to an elementary computable ordinal representation system. In what follows, C (ε +1 , 0) will be abbreviated to T ( ).
In the case of PA the addition of an infinitary rule restored the possibility of cut elimination. In order to obtain a similar result for set theories like KP, one has to work a bit harder. A peculiarity of PA is that every object n of the intended model has a canonical name in the language, namely, the n th numeral. It is not clear, though, how to bestow a canonical name to each element of the set-theoretic universe. This is where Gödel's constructible universe L comes in handy. As L is "made" from the ordinals it is pretty obvious how to "name" sets in L once one has names for ordinals. These will be taken from T ( ). Henceforth, we shall restrict ourselves to ordinals from T ( ). The set terms and their ordinal levels are defined inductively. First, for each α ∈ T ( ) ∩ , there will be a set term L α . Its ordinal level is declared to be α. If F (a, b) is a set-theoretic formula (whose free variables are among the indicated) and s ≡ s 1 , . . . , s n are set terms with levels < α, then the formal expression
The collection of set terms will serve as a formal universe for a theory KP ∞ with infinitary rules. The infinitary rule for the universal quantifier on the right takes the form: From ⇒ , F (t) for all RS -terms t conclude ⇒ , ∀x F (x). There are also rules for bounded universal quantifiers: From ⇒ , F (t) for all RSterms t with levels < α conclude ⇒ , (∀x ∈ L α ) F (x). The corresponding rule for introducing a universal quantifier bounded by a term of the form {x∈L α : F (x, s) L α } is slightly more complicated. With the help of these infinitary rules it now possible to give logical deductions of all axioms of KP with the exception of Bounded Collection. The latter can be deduced from the rule of -Reflection: From ⇒ , C conclude ⇒ , ∃z C z for every -formula C. The class offormulae is the smallest class of formulae containing the bounded formulae which is closed under ∧, ∨, bounded quantification and unbounded existential quantification. C z is obtained from C by replacing all unbounded quantifiers ∃x in C by ∃x ∈ z.
The length and cut ranks of KP ∞ -deductions will be measured by ordinals from T ( ). KP-derivation of B( u) .
The usual cut elimination procedure works unless the cut formulae have been introduced by -reflection rules. The obstacle to pushing cut elimination further is exemplified by the following scenario:
In general, it won't be possible to remove such an instance of the Cut Rule. However, if the complexity of the side formulae is just right, the cut can be removed by a technique called collapsing of deductions. This method applies when the formulae in and are -formulae and the formulae in and are -formulae. The class of -formulae is the smallest class of formulae containing the bounded formulae which is closed under ∧, ∨, bounded quantification and unbounded universal quantification.
For the technique of collapsing one needs the function α → ψ (α) and, moreover, it is necessary to ensure that the infinite deductions are of a very uniform character. The details are rather finicky and took several years to work out. The upshot is that every sentence C deducible in KP has a cut-free deduction in KP ∞ of length ψ (ε +1 ), which entails that L ψ (ε +1 ) |= C. Moreover, the proof-theoretic ordinal of KP is ψ (ε +1 ), also known as the Bachmann-Howard ordinal. Recall that KPl is the set-theoretic version of ( 1 1 -AC) + BI, while KPi is the set-theoretic counterpart to ( 1 1 -AC) + BI . The main axiom of KPl says that every set is contained in an admissible set (one also says that the admissible sets are cofinal in the universe) without requiring that the universe is also admissible, too. To get a sense of scale for comparing KP, KPl, and KPi it is perhaps best to relate the large cardinal assumptions that give rise to the pertaining ordinal representation systems. In the case of KPl the assumptions is that there are infinitely many large ordinals feature of admissible sets is that they are models of Bounded Collection and that that principle is equivalent to Reflection on the basis of the other axioms of KP (see [4] ). Furthermore, admissible sets of the form L κ also satisfy 2 reflection, i.e., if L κ |= ∀x ∃y C(x, y, a) with C(x, y) bounded and a ∈ L κ , then there exists ρ < κ such that a ∈ L ρ and L ρ |= ∀x ∃y C(x, y, a) .
In essence, admissible proof theory is a gathering of cut-elimination and collapsing techniques that can handle infinitary calculi of set theory with and/or 2 reflection rules, and thus lends itself to ordinal analyses of theories of the form KP+ "there are x many admissibles" or KP+ "there are many admissibles".
A theory on the verge of admissible proof theory is KPM, designed to axiomatize essential features of a recursively Mahlo universe of sets. An admissible ordinal κ is said to be recursively Mahlo if it satisfies 2 -reflection in the above sense but with the extra condition that the reflecting set L ρ be admissible as well. The ordinal representation [25] for KPM is built on the assumption that there exists a Mahlo cardinal. The novel feature of over previous work is that there are two layers of collapsing functions. The ordinal analysis for KPM was carried out in [26] . A different approach to KPM using ordinal diagrams is due to Arai [1] .
The means of admissible proof theory are too weak to deal with the next level of reflection having three alternations of quantifiers, i.e. 3 -reflection.
Rewards of ordinal analysis
Results that have been achieved through ordinal analysis mainly fall into four groups: (1) Consistency of subsystems of classical second order arithmetic and set theory relative to constructive theories, (2) reductions of theories formulated as conservation theorems, (3) combinatorial independence results, and (4) classifications of provable functions and ordinals. A detailed account of these results has been given in [31] , section 3. An example where ordinal representation systems led to a new combinatorial result was Friedman's extension of Kruskal's Theorem, EKT, which asserts that finite trees are well-quasi-ordered under gap embeddability (see [39] ). The gap condition imposed on the embeddings is directly related to an ordinal notation system that was used for the analysis of 1 1 comprehension. The principle EKT played a crucial role in the proof of the graph minor theorem of Robertson and Seymour (see [16] ).
Theorem 2.1 (Robertson, Seymour). For any infinite sequence
. . of finite graphs there exist i < j so that G i is isomorphic to a minor of G j .
Beyond admissible proof theory
Gentzen fostered hopes that with sufficiently large constructive ordinals one could establish the consistency of analysis, i.e., Z 2 . The purpose of this section is to report on the next major step in analyzing fragments of Z 2 . This is obviously the ordinal analysis of the system ( 1 2 -CA). 1 The strength of ( 1 2 -CA) dwarfs that of ( 1 1 -AC). The treatment of 1 2 comprehension posed formidable technical challenges (see [30] , [32] , [33] ). Other approaches to ordinal analysis of systems above 1 1 -AC are due to Arai (see [1] , [2] ) who uses ordinal diagrams and finite deductions, and Carlson [11] who employs patterns of resemblance.
In the following, we will gradually slice 1 2 comprehension into degrees of reflection to achieve a sense of scale. There is no way to describe this comprehension simply in terms of admissibility except that on the set-theoretic side, 1 2 comprehension corresponds to 1 separation, i.e. the scheme of axioms ∃z(z = {x ∈ a : φ(x)}) for all 1 formulas φ. The precise relationship is as follows: The ordinals κ such that L κ |= KP + 1 -Separation are familiar from ordinal recursion theory. Definition 3.2. An admissible ordinal κ is said to be nonprojectible if there is no total κ-recursive function mapping κ one-one into some β < κ, where a function
The key to the 'largeness' properties of nonprojectible ordinals is that for any nonprojectible ordinal κ, L κ is a limit of 1 -elementary substructures, i.e. for every
The last result makes it clear that an ordinal analysis of 1 2 comprehension would necessarily involve a proof-theoretic treatment of reflections beyond those surfacing in admissible proof theory. The notion of stability will be instrumental.
For our purposes we need refinements of this notion, the simplest being provided by:
where C is n , and Tran(z) expresses that z is a transitive set.
n -reflection for all n suffices to express one step in the ≺ 1 relation.
The step of analyzing Kripke-Platek set theory augmented by n -reflection rules was taken in [29] ; the ordinal representation system for 3 -reflection employed a weakly compact cardinal.
A further refinement of the notion of δ-stability will be addressed next. Putting the previous definition to work, one gets:
If κ is δ + 1-1 -reflecting, then, for all n, κ is δ-n -reflecting.
At this point let us return to proof theory to explain the need for even further refinements of the preceding notions. Recall that the first nonprojectible ordinal ρ is a limit of smaller ordinals ρ n such that L ρ n ≺ 1 L ρ . In the ordinal representation system OR for 1 2 -CA, there will be symbols E n and E ω for ρ n and ρ, respectively. The associated infinitary proof system will have rules
where C( x) is a formula, s are set terms of levels < E n + δ, and δ < E ω . These rules suffice to bring about the embedding KP + 1 -Separation into the infinitary proof system, but reflection rules galore will be needed to carry out cut-elimination. For example, there will be "many" ordinals π, δ ∈ OR that play the role of δ-n+1 -reflecting ordinals by virtue of corresponding reflection rules in the infinitary calculus.
A large cardinal notion
An important part of ordinal analysis is the development of ordinal representation systems. Extensive ordinal representation systems are difficult to understand from a purely syntactical point of view, often to such an extent that it makes no sense to present an ordinal representation system without giving some kind of semantic interpretation. Large cardinals have been used quite frequently in the definition procedure of strong ordinal representation systems, and large cardinal notions have been an important source of inspiration. In the end, they can be dispensed with, but they add an intriguing twist to the relation between set theory and proof theory. The advantage of working in a strong set-theoretic context is that we can build models without getting buried under complexity considerations.
Such systems are usually generated from collapsing functions. However, from now on we prefer to call them projection functions since they will no longer bear any resemblance to Mostowski's collapsing function. In [33] , the projection functions needed for the ordinal analysis of 1 2 have been construed as inverses to certain partial elementary embeddings. In this final section we shall indicate a model for the projection functions, employing rather sweeping large cardinal axioms, in that we shall presume the existence of certain cardinals, featuring a strong form of indescribability, dubbed shrewdness.
To be able to eliminate reflections of the type described in Definition 3.6 requires projection functions which can project intervals [κ, κ + δ] of ordinals down below κ. We will also consider a notion of shrewdness with regard to a given class. Let U be a fresh unary predicate symbol. Given a language L let L(U) denote its extension by U. If A is a class we denote by V α ; A the structure V α ; ∈; A ∩ V α .
For an L set (U)-sentence φ, let the meaning of " V α ; A |= φ" be determined by interpreting U(t) as t ∈ A ∩ V α . There are similarities between the notions of η-shrewdness and η-indescribability (see [12] , Ch. 9, §4). However, it should be noted that if κ is η-indescribable and ρ < η, it does not necessarily follow that κ is also ρ-indescribable (see [12] , 9.4.6).
A reason for calling the above cardinals shrewd is that if there is a shrewd cardinal κ in the universe, then, loosely speaking, for any notion of large cardinal N which does not make reference to the totality of all ordinals, if there exists an N-cardinal then the least such cardinal is below κ. So for instance, if there are measurable and shrewd cardinals in the universe, then the least measurable is smaller than the least shrewd cardinal.
To situate the notion of shrewdness with regard to consistency strength in the usual hierarchy of large cardinals, we recall the notion of a subtle cardinal.
Definition 4.4.
A cardinal κ is said to be subtle if for any sequence S α : α < κ such that S α ⊆ α and C closed and unbounded in κ, there are β < δ both in C satisfying S δ ∩ β = S β .
Since subtle cardinals are not covered in many of the standard texts dealing with large cardinals, we mention the following facts (see [22] , §20): (ii) 'Subtlety' relativises to L, i.e. if π is subtle, then L |= " π is subtle". Lemma 4.6. Assume that π is a subtle cardinal and that A ⊆ V π . Then for every B ⊆ π closed and unbounded in π there exists κ ∈ B such that V π ; A |= " κ is A-shrewd ".
Corollary 4.7.
Assume that π is a subtle cardinal. Then there exists a cardinal κ < π such that κ is η-shrewd for all η < π.
